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Abstract 
The Costa Rican talk of crime is fundamentally based on the assumption that crime rates 
have increased significantly in recent years and that there is today a vast and alarming 
amount of crime. On the basis of this assumption, fear of crime, the call for the “iron fist,” 
and drastic law enforcement actions are continually increasing. While crime statistics are 
the logical basis for the hypothesis on the far-reaching extent of delinquency, they are used 
in a problematic way in the talk of crime. In this paper I discuss Costa Rican crime statis-
tics, their development, and their utilization in the talk of crime against the background of 
criminological theory. The theses of the paper are that a) the informative value of crime 
statistics regarding Costa Rican reality is far more questionable than the common utiliza-
tion of them implies and b) when they are used as argumentation, these crime statistics do 
not provide evidence of the oft-proclaimed rising crime wave. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Kultur der Angst und Kontrolle in Costa Rica (I):  
Kriminalitätsstatistiken und Strafverfolgung 
Der costaricanische öffentliche Diskurs über Gewalt und Kriminalität stützt sich wesent-
lich auf die Prämisse, dass die Kriminalitätsraten in den letzten Jahren in unvergleichli-
chem Umfang gewachsen seien und heute ein überwältigendes und alarmierendes Aus-
maß erreicht hätten. Auf dem Fundament dieser Prämisse wächst in der Bevölkerung die 
gesellschaftliche Angst und damit der Ruf nach der harten Hand und immer drastischeren 
staatlichen und privatisierten Maßnahmen der Kriminalitätsbekämpfung. Kriminalitäts-
statistiken werden in der Regel als Beleg für die These einer Kriminalitätswelle angeführt. 
Im öffentlichen Diskurs werden sie aber auf sehr problematische Weise interpretiert. Die-
ser Beitrag untersucht die offiziellen Kriminalitätsstatistiken, ihre historische Entwicklung 
und ihren Gebrauch im Diskurs über Gewalt und Kriminalität in Costa Rica anhand krimi-
nologischer Theorie. Die Hypothese ist, dass, erstens, die Aussagekraft der Statistiken über 
costaricanische Realität weit geringer ist, als ihre übliche Verwendung impliziert, und dass, 
zweitens, die Statistiken selbst dann die proklamierte Welle des Verbrechens nicht stützen, 
wenn man sie tatsächlich zugrunde legt. 
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1 Introduction 
In the public debate about crime and violence in contemporary Costa Rica, statistics are the 
most explicitly or implicitly cited reference for the common thesis of the “rising crime wave.”1 
Thus, the participants in the talk of crime throw around numbers which can differ widely, 
while the tendency always seems the same: things are getting worse and worse. At the same 
time, those citing these numbers rarely name their sources. Others simply proclaim that there 
is rising violence and crime without any statistical support for their statements, but in this case 
also the assumption of rising crime is implicitly based on numbers. The named or implied sta-
                                                     
1  I owe Rodolfo Calderón Umaña a debt of gratitude for providing me with a great deal of advice and correc-
tions regarding Costa Rican crime statistics and their realization. 
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tistics are mostly used in a multidimensional generalized way. They are presented as an objec-
tive mirror of social reality, as valid for every kind of crime, and also as valid for the whole 
country. They usually differentiate neither between different groups of crimes nor different 
concrete locations. Finally, legitimate criticism of the statistics is rare. In this paper I will fill 
this gap and argue that an objective view of the Costa Rican crime statistics casts a different 
light on the talk of crime.2 
Newspaper articles are a good source for proving this type of generalization. A citation from 
an article written by then vice president and minister of justice Laura Chinchilla from August 
2007 demonstrates the numbers game: 
In recent years we have been witnesses to an alarming trend of increasing criminal vio-
lence. […] Between 1990 and 2006, for example, the total number of crimes per 100,000 
citizens rose from 135 to 295, and some of them increased in an especially alarming 
way: in the case of robberies, which increased by 700 percent, and in the case of viola-
tions of narcotics law, where numbers increased by 280 percent. Violent crimes also ex-
perienced a significant increase; for instance, in the case of physical aggression, where 
the rate increased more than 100 percent. The same was true of intentional homicide, an 
excellent indicator for the level of violence in a country, where numbers increased by 50 
percent in the same period.3 
(La Nación, August 19, 2007) 
These numbers have an enormous influence on the talk of crime. Even if the source remains 
undisclosed, the figures appear to be valid when cited by an important person on the one 
hand and based on the common perception that numbers don’t lie on the other hand. Hardly 
anybody proves the validity of cited statistics or questions them theoretically. Once thrown 
into the discourse (and especially when this is done by trustworthy persons), they become 
“valid knowledge” (Jäger 2004: 149). While the accuracy of statistics is in fact highly debat-
able, their immense influence on the talk of crime should not be underestimated. Interviews 
with Costa Rican citizens I undertook in 2006 revealed the power of these numbers and the 
good faith people had in them. Of approximately 30 interviewees with whom I conducted 
open interviews, each with a duration of approximately one hour, 23 stated that violence and 
crime are worse today than they have been previously (Huhn 2008a: 15; Rico 2006: 29-36).4 
                                                     
2  Following Caldeira, by talk of crime I mean the dominant discourse about violence and crime as a social mat-
ter. Caldeira defines the talk of crime as the everyday discourses about crime as a permanent threat—
mediated in narratives, commentaries, conversations or even jokes—that “simultaneously make fear circulate 
and proliferate” (Caldeira 2000: 2). 
3  All Spanish and German citations have been translated by the author. 
4  In order to obtain a representative opinion for the whole society, I interviewed males and females of different 
ages with different jobs, social backgrounds, and experiences in various locations throughout Costa Rica in 
November and December 2006. For example, I spoke to policemen, judges, prison wardens and guards, social 
workers, and NGO activists as well as to nurses, businessmen, domestic employees, priests, street vendors 
and pub owners. I thus spoke with people who deal with crime and violence professionally and with others 
who do not. 
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They implicitly or explicitly explained their estimation using the crime statistics or, alterna-
tively, statements they had heard about them. The proportion of those who actually read offi-
cial crime statistics was negligible. 
The first aim of this paper is the presentation and critical evaluation of Costa Rican criminal sta-
tistics. I do not discuss the statistics as a mirror of Costa Rican social reality but rather as a 
powerful premise in the talk of crime. I argue that the crime rates are used as a powerful 
weapon by those speakers on the talk of crime who should know how to read them but who 
obviously want to misrepresent the extent of the problem. I also prove that the problem—
perceived as gigantic and existing everywhere (Huhn 2008a)—might be far more relative and 
manageable than generally believed, at least in terms of its extent, its development, and its spa-
tiality. I will first present and discuss Costa Rican crime-fighting efforts since the 1950s—as an 
important factor influencing the statistics and the visibility of crime and violence in society—
and relate these to the crime statistics and the social perception of delinquency and violence in 
society. Some basic findings from criminological theory on the statistical measurement of de-
linquency serve as the paper’s theoretical basis, which I outline in the following section. 
2 What Are Crime Statistics (and What Are They Good For)? 
The general academic criticisms of crime statistics are multifaceted (Muncie 1996; Muncie 
2004; Maguire 2002; Maguire 2007; Schmidt 2005; and on Latin America Carrión/Espín 2009). 
They range from a radical denegation of their usability to describe “reality” to a restrained re-
view of particular indicators by those who work on advancing the statistics. While the amount 
of technical criticism and general skepticism is enormous and rich in detail, I will briefly con-
centrate on some central factors from both sides of the critical spectrum in order to subse-
quently ask which criticisms have to be applied in a relativization of the Costa Rican statistics 
and a critical reflection on their sense and use. 
The main source of technical malfunctions in official crime statistics is the hidden figure of 
crime (Coleman/Moynihan 1996). Especially from a historical perspective, the number of er-
rors resulting from these figure is immense. The hidden figure describes the number of unre-
ported (relative) or even undiscovered (absolute) cases. The absolute hidden figure consists 
of crimes which remain undiscovered. This may happen for many different reasons. A typical 
example is provided by robberies which remain undetected by the victims, who do not real-
ize that they have been mugged. Another example is homicides which are not diagnosed by 
the physician who writes the death certificate.5 In homicide statistics, therefore, homicides 
with weapons are generally overrepresented. A bullet in the head or a knife in the chest can 
simply not be overseen as easily. A third example is provided by cases in which a judge has 
                                                     
5  Criminologists consider the number of such cases to be very high. An analysis of homicides which were not 
recognized until a second autopsy revealed a crime suggests that nearly half of all homicides in Germany re-
main undiscovered (Brinkmann 1997). 
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to find someone not guilty for want of evidence. Thus, even though it is possible that the 
crime happened in reality, from the point of the verdict on it will not have happened in terms 
of law and statistics. Already it becomes apparent that crime statistics do not measure reality 
per se. The absolute hidden field is generally estimated to be very extensive, through a meas-
urement is by definition impossible. 
The reasons for the relative hidden figure are multiple. Firstly, many cases are not reported, for 
several reasons. Some cases are considered trivial (such as small thefts), and in some cases the 
victims are afraid of revenge or are ashamed (as is often the case with sexual violence). Many 
people do not recognize crime, for example, children who do not know the law, and many 
people decide to take the law into their own hands. The latter is very common in relation to 
physical violence such as brawls. While a person who has been beaten can press charges 
against the offender, he will often prefer to fight back. Against this background, many assaults 
usually remain unreported. Crimes which are reported more than others are statistically more 
serious crimes, especially those where the victim has to report the crime to make a claim for in-
surance (Maguire 2007: 262; Muncie 2004: 16). Therefore, a very high number of car accidents 
and thefts are reported in comparison to other kinds of crimes. The existence of insurance and 
the obligation to report a claim as a crime to the police also influences crime statistics.6 
Generally, changing norms and values influence crime rates, and thus awareness among soci-
ety plays an important role. For example, the media extensively advocates social sensibility 
(Ricón/Rey 2009: 124; Rey 2005). The so-called deviancy-amplification spiral describes the 
process by which people tend to report criminal acts that have been discussed in the media, 
which are presented as worse than they are and as socially unacceptable (Cohen 1972). Over 
time, different kinds of offenses appear and disappear in public awareness. While there is a 
general sensibility about sexual violence or violence against children today, these offenses 
have been socially invisible for a long time. Sexual violence was long classified as private, and 
many violent acts against children were considered to be the personal concern of the parents. 
Another example is youth crime, which has frequently alternated between being tolerated as 
youth attitude or condemned as criminal behavior (Muncie 2004: 18). 
These social changes in looking at crime apply to the self-perception of a person as a victim of 
a crime, too (Zedner 1997). Whether a person sees him/herself as a victim and admits this pub-
licly depends to a large part on public discourse and its historical change. Sexual violence is a 
good example. There have been times when many women did not interpret violence by their 
partners as a crime, but rather as “his good right,” something nobody would care about or a 
relationship crisis instead of a felony. The same is true of many forms of physical violence and 
the victimization of children. The victim of a brawl often does not see him/herself as a crime 
victim, or at least does not report it, and an abused child often just doesn’t know that violence 
                                                     
6  Furthermore, insurance fraud does so as well. As many insurance plans pay for damage caused by others but 
not by the owner, the number of persons who file charges against an unknown person to cover their own 
mistakes and claim insurance could be significant. 
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is “illegal” (Stanko 1988; Morgan 1988; Young 1988: 174). This denial on the part of the victim 
may be a consequence of the dominant discourse. An example would be a judge who does not 
acknowledge the victim of rape as a victim by stating instead that he or she provoked the of-
fender by wearing a certain kind of clothing or by saying something “capable of being misun-
derstood” (Sykes/Matza 1996). Finally, changes in what the law counts as crime logically in-
fluence statistics (Muncie 2004: 17). These are just some examples of the many factors that in-
fluence crime statistics, which are therefore not an objective mirror of “reality.” 
Another source of error—especially from a historical perspective—lies in the statistics them-
selves, and in the changing capacity to receive complaints, to translate them into a statistical 
unit, and to transform this into a national statistic. 
First, the content of crime statistics changes over time. While these statistics were previously 
often very simple and summarized, today they are generally very detailed; however, at the 
same time some acts which used to be crimes are not today and vice versa. While marijuana 
possession was once legal in Germany, for example, it was later made illegal and extensively 
prosecuted then subsequently moderately tolerated again. This change in drug policy thus in-
fluences the statistics. At one time there was no statistical unit for marijuana abuse, then it be-
came illegal and crime rates in this segment were rising. Today the abuse is again legal, but 
the statistical unit still exists. An uncritical reading of the statistic would imply that marijuana 
abuse has plummeted since the liberalization of the law in the 1990s. In this context, the deci-
sion regarding which source is the basis of an official crime statistic and which facets are indi-
cators which might change over time. There will be a difference if the registered number of 
homicides committed is the official homicide rate or the number of victims. 
Second, every crime that is reported requires a police officer to take the complaint. As Cre-
mer-Schäfer (1998: 149) points out, crime statistics are “a redefinition of police and juridical 
activity reports,” which document police work, not crimes committed. More police person-
nel, therefore, leads to higher crime rates, and fewer police personnel leads to lower crime 
rates. This is the case in pressing charges as well as in patrolling. The second phenomena be-
came famous in Germany as the Lüchow-Dannenberg Syndrome (Nissen 2003: 121). When 
the police presence in the village Lüchow Dannenberg was increased because—as an interim 
storage location for nuclear waste—the village became the center of protests against nuclear 
energy production, the number of registered contraventions of the law increased remarkably. 
The number of delicts had not expanded; they were simply less likely to be overseen. 
Third, those who handle crime statistics need to do so consistently and need to be technically 
able to do so. Older Costa Rican crime statistics lead to the assumption that some police posts 
simply did not hand in their statistics or did not register their work for several years. Other-
wise there is no explanation for why in some years there are no registered crimes at all in cer-
tain districts. Thus the reliability of crime statistics depends on the capacity to register crime 
and to merge these registered crimes into nationwide statistics together with the probability 
of not making mistakes in doing so, something which is technically developed through the 
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use of computers instead of typewriters, through simpler data transfer technologies or 
through advanced statistical software. 
Finally, I have already mentioned another point related to technical ability: the advances in 
crime investigation techniques. While more crimes may have remained undiscovered for tech-
nical reasons in the past, today forensics, data collection, high-tech crime scene investigations 
and so on are helping to increase the bright figure (which is the opposite of hidden figure). 
While crime statistics are generally very unreliable, and were even more unreliable in the 
past, and while the historical comparability is particularly vague, they are usually presented 
as an unalterable, objective and timeless image of reality. Nevertheless, as Young states, 
To base criminological theory, or social policy for that matter, on the majority of official 
figures is an exercise in “guesstimates”, and tealeaf gazing. Meanwhile, various groups 
with special pleading regularity, and understandably, parade their “statistics” to show 
that their section of the community needs resources or that their agency has had such 
and such a success rate. 
(Young 1988: 164) 
As the other most commonly used statistical indicator of crime rates and their change over 
time, victim surveys should also be mentioned briefly. Implemented not least because of the 
problems with criminal statistics discussed above, victim surveys basically ask an empirically 
defined number of people if they have been the victim of a crime within a certain period and if 
they reported it to the police. As the range of topics and the complexity of victim surveys is to-
day often very sophisticated, they may serve as a useful indicator for crime development and 
definitely supplement the weak data of crime statistics. At the same time, most of the criticisms 
of crime statistics presented here also hold for the surveys. Response behavior does not neces-
sarily depend only on objective incidents; it can also be influenced by the talk of crime. As al-
ready stated, somebody who has been the victim of a crime firstly has to recognize this, sec-
ondly has to define it as a crime (instead of an annoying bagatelle, for example), and thirdly 
must be willing to tell.7 In times when fear of crime is widespread and crime plays an impor-
tant role in public discourse, this self-perception as a victim might be far more likely than in 
quiet times. At one moment vandalism in front gardens might be perceived as a more or less 
annoying practical joke; at other times it might be perceived as a case of youth crime. 
In Costa Rica, the United Nations Development Programme has so far conducted two Encues-
tas Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana (National Surveys on Public Safety). The last and second 
of these victim surveys was undertaken in 2006. In addition to victimization, the surveys also 
cover fear of crime, public perceptions of Costa Rican law enforcement, questions related to 
personal protective actions, and the social behavior of the interviewees (see for example 
PNUD 2006: 553-559). As crime statistics are still by far the most cited reference to crime in 
Costa Rican public discourse, I will concentrate on them in this paper. 
                                                     
7  On victimology, victim surveys, and their critics see Young 1988 and 2004 and Hoyle/Zedner 2007. 
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In the following discussion I being by tracing Costa Rican law enforcement since the 1950s. As 
the visibility of crime and violence depend on the number of institutions and persons whose 
job it is to exhibit and count them, I will prove that Costa Rica has made huge progress in in-
vestigating and fighting crime, something which is clearly reflected in crime statistics. 
3 The Development of the Security Sector 
Despite the possibility that crime rates have constantly increased over the second half of the 
twentieth century and that crime may always have been a thorn in the side of Costa Rican so-
ciety, another development during the second half of the twentieth century is very important: 
violence and crime have been investigated and fought to an increasing degree and have 
therefore become constantly more visible in society. As already stated, more police personnel 
unavoidably leads to higher crime rates, and fewer police personnel leads to lower crime 
rates. Furthermore, better technical equipment for both investigating crime and for recording 
it also logically leads to higher crime rates in the statistics. Therefore, a closer look at the de-
velopment of the security sector is a necessary prerequisite to interpreting Costa Rican crime 
statistics, both generally and, especially, diachronically. 
After the abolition of the armed forces in December 1948, Costa Rica established a police 
corps—the Guardia Civil—in 1949 to maintain public order. Until this date there had existed 
nothing like a professional police force in Costa Rica. In practice the former military was now 
renamed the Guardia Civil and was thus assigned a very different task.8 It can be assumed 
that knowledge of police work was very limited at this time. It was not until 1964 that the 
Costa Rican state established a new academy to actually professionally train policemen.9 In 
the interim, the former military school undertook this task.10 This means that until the mid-
1960s Costa Rican policemen were basically trained and educated according to a military way 
of thinking and acting. Fighting a foreign enemy is a very different task than maintaining law 
and order inside a country, but it was not until the 1960s that military logic was replaced 
with the idea of an actual police logic. Additionally, the judiciary was reorganized after 1948. 
The new government adopted a new penal code and a new law for criminal proceedings. In 
1956 the judiciary became financially independent from the executive, with an annual budget 
of at least 6 percent of the of national budget (Poder Judicial: 5). 
In 1964 the government took the first steps towards improving the training and education of 
the country’s jurists, and in 1981 these efforts were merged in the newly established Escuela 
Judicial (Law School), the mission of which was to “develop programs for the special qualifi-
cation of judiciary personnel which allow them to strengthen their knowledge and conduct 
for the adequate handling of their tasks so that they can contribute to an efficient and compe-
                                                     
8  Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica: Historia, www.msp.go.cr/sobre_ministerio/historia.html. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Escuela Nacional de Policía José Francisco Orlich B.: Historia, www.msp.go.cr/escuela_policia/historia.html. 
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tent administration” (Poder Judicial: 21). In conclusion, the Costa Rican police and judiciary 
were both basically untrained, professionally speaking, in investigating and fighting crime in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The discovery of crimes and particularly the conviction of suspects was 
very difficult, subjective, and debatable as the police force was neither adequately trained nor 
technically equipped to work professionally. 
The 1970s marked a fundamental change in investigating and fighting crime in Costa Rica. In 
1973 the government founded the Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ), the criminal in-
vestigation department, whose task it was to assist the criminal courts and the Ministerio 
Público (Public Attorney's Office) in the exposure and scientific verification of delicts and the 
presumed delinquents (Asamblea Legislativa 1974, Article 1). This was the most sustainable 
act on the way to a modern fight against crime. The OIJ’s mission was to process charges 
made by members of the public and to investigate crimes at a high technical level. The OIJ was 
therefore divided into three sections: the Department of Criminal Investigation, to detect and 
investigate crimes; the Department of Legal Medicine, to conduct medical investigations such 
as autopsies or generate psychological opinions to detect undiscovered crimes; and finally the 
Laboratory of Forensic Science, to trace evidence with technical and natural scientific methods 
in order to detect so far undiscovered crimes and convict delinquents (Poder Judicial: 20). 
Without speculating about the actual number of crimes committed in Costa Rica and about the 
development of this rate, it is safe to say that from that point on more and more crimes would 
become visible and therefore “real” and also that new forms of crime would be identified, 
simply for the reason that it would be increasingly technically possible. 
Over the decades following its foundation, the OIJ has become more and more specialized 
and structured. In 1992 it added a canine unit, which radically changed the investigation of 
drug crimes. In 2003 the Unidad de Análisis Criminal (Criminal Analysis Unit) was founded 
in order to enhance the use of scientific methods in fighting crime. Later the Costa Rican gov-
ernment established the Servicio Policial de Intervención Inmediata (SPII), a special interven-
tion police force, and in 2008 the Unidad de Vigilancia y Seguimiento, another intelligence 
unit whose members were trained by the FBI and the DEA, was set up. Furthermore, the OIJ 
opened more and more regional offices and specialized subdivisions.11 
In June 1975, the Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la Prevención del 
Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente (ILANUD - United Nations Latin American Institute for 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders), based in Costa Rica, was founded 
by the United Nations. The ILANUD’s main objective has since been the provision of assis-
tance to Latin American governments in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. 
This includes research, training and technical assistance in designing and implementing pro-
grams and projects in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. The ILANUD has by 
definition called attention to violence and crime in Costa Rica. 
                                                     
11  OIJ (www.poder-judicial.go.cr/oij/oijaccesibilidad.htm). 
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In 1978 the Costa Rican government created the Dirección Nacional del Servicio de Vigilancia 
Marítima, the Coast Guard. While its initial task was the protection of Costa Rican fishing 
grounds, its authority was continually expanded. Today’s Coast Guard is legally defined in 
the Ley de Creación del Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas (Law for the Creation of the Coast 
Guard) (Asamblea Legislativa 2000) from May 2000. The investigation of smuggling and the 
drug trade has become its major task.12 As already stated with regard to the OIJ, drug traffick-
ing and smuggling have consequently become increasingly visible and therefore real. 
In the 1980s the Fuerza Pública—the police force—became increasingly better equipped, not 
least as a result of the appearance of a new threat, the Nicaraguan contra war, and a newly in-
vented crime, illegal migration. In 1983 the Ministry of Justice passed a resolution to monitor 
Costa Rica’s borders and detect and avoid undocumented immigration (La Nación, March 10, 
1983). While undocumented immigration was at that point not illegal per se, it was assumed 
that many undocumented migrants could be delinquents (La Nación, April 12, 1985). Thus, in 
1986 the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería (Immigration Act), the first general migration 
law, was adopted. It created a whole new catalog of crimes and made necessary the rein-
forcement of police equipment (Huhn 2005: 71-72). Personnel had to be expanded as did the 
amount of technical equipment such as jeeps and helicopters. Furthermore, in 1994 the gov-
ernment established a special border police force (Asamblea Legislativa 1994a). Once again, 
new kinds of crimes had been invented and the police force was extended in order to register 
more crimes. Additionally, in 1981 the Costa Rican government passed a bill on private secu-
rity (Asamblea Legislativa 1981), which has been modified several times since. These are ex-
amples of what has become a very specialized and elaborate Costa Rican security sector. 
Between 1988 and 2003 the Costa Rican judiciary grew from 3,344 to 6,871 employees. The 
OIJ had 819 members in 1988. With 1,562 employees in 2003, the manpower of the criminal 
investigation department had nearly doubled in 16 years (Figure 1). Additionally, today there 
are 1,134 registered private security agencies active in Costa Rica, and 18,823 licensed private 
security agents work in country.13 In 2001 the number was 934 (PNUD 2006: 222). The num-
ber of private security agents operating without a license is estimated to be much higher than 
the number of licensed agents (Matul/Dinarte 2005: 19). 
I would also like to mention the Programa de Seguridad Comunitaria (Community Safety 
Program), which was initiated in 1998. Under the program, citizens form committees for 
community security, are trained and instructed by the police, and afterwards monitor their 
neighborhoods. In 2003, Costa Ricans had formed 2,817 of these committees (MIDEPLAN 
2004: 732); three years later there were already 3,590 such committees (MIDEPLAN 2007: 
114). One supporting pillar of informal and formal private security and citizen’s involvement 
                                                     
12  Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica: Historia de los Servicios de Guardacostas, www.msp.go.cr/ 
guardacostas/historia.html. 
13  Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica: Seguridad Privada, www.msp.go.cr/seguridad_privada/esta 
disticas.html. 
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in police work is essentially denunciation. Thereby, many delinquent acts which have not 
previously been registered are today reported to the police. Most of these acts are bagatelles, 
and the Ministerio de Planificación also states that a considerable number of these denuncia-
tions turn out to be false reports.14 
Figure 1: Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ) Personnel, 1988–2003 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 1. 
It should also be mentioned that new criminal acts have been introduced into Costa Rican law 
over time. In the 2002 revision of the penal code, the government declared the negligence of 
animals and the blockading of streets to be delicts. Both were contraventions before the revi-
sion of the law and crimes afterwards. These “new” crimes have automatically and logically 
enhanced the total number of recorded crimes since. 
Finally, the development of surveillance technology has made crime more visible, statistically 
measurable, and therefore “real.” Closed-circuit television is a perfect example (see for exam-
ple Löfberg 2009: 154). As the monitoring of public spaces becomes more and more common 
in Costa Rica, far fewer delicts are overseen. 
The institutional, discursive and technical developments mentioned represent only a small 
percentage of all the efforts Costa Rica has made concerning the fight against violence and 
crime in the last decades. Today the country has a very sophisticated police force, including 
special subdivisions for drugs, rural and urban police, migration, border control, domestic 
violence, tourist safety, traffic control, intelligence and other issues, and there are also various 
programs, plans, and institutions in the fields of crime fighting, crime prevention, and educa-
tion (Loría 2006; Ministerio de Salud 2004; MIDEPLAN 2007; PNUD 2006; Matul/Dinarte 
2005; Rico 2003; Ministerio de Justicia 2007). 
It is not my intention to judge the various efforts to fight crime and violence. Instead I want 
to demonstrate that during the second half of the twentieth century, and especially since the 
1970s, violence and crime received increasingly more attention in politics and therefore be-
                                                     
14  Ministerio de Planificación: http://mideplan5.mideplan.go.cr/PND_ADM_PACHECO/Html/panorama-ambi 
ente-seguridad.htm#Seguridad. 
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came more and more visible in Costa Rican society (and the potential hidden figure of crime 
may have declined in consequence).15 As Caldeira points out, crime statistics are 
constructions that generate particular views of some segments of social reality. They 
construct images of patterns of crime and criminal behavior. Today it is hard to argue 
that they are a representation of “real” crime—if one can still talk in those terms. At 
most, one can claim that the statistics indicate some tendencies of criminality. But if the 
information they give on crime is restricted, they may nevertheless reveal other facts 
about the society that produces them. 
(Caldeira 2000:106). 
In the case of Costa Rica, crime statistics—among other things—reflect the progression of the 
extensive crime-fighting efforts made by the state in the last forty years. Nevertheless, I also 
agree with Caldeira in her interpretation that crime statistics may at least indicate tendencies if 
one is able to interpret them properly. In the following section I will present and discuss the 
basic indicators of crime and violence from a historical perspective. In each case, I will ask if 
and to what extent the diachronic comparison of the figures justifies the talk of the oft-cited 
“rising crime wave,” and how the figures have to be evaluated on the basis of the criticisms of 
crime statistics. I thereby basically prove that a contrary point of view to the mainstream posi-
tion of the “rising crime wave” is reasonable, without necessarily insisting on the opposite 
view as “the truth.” Nevertheless, as I can prove that the statistics can be read very differently 
from the way they are portrayed in the dominant discourse, I can justify my recommendation 
that they be discussed differently in public, where the contested “enormous crime wave” ob-
viously scares the majority of the people, as surveys indicate (see for example PNUD 2006: 
551-559 or Huhn 2008a). 
4 Trends in Crime and Violence 
While Costa Rica already recorded criminal statistics in the nineteenth century (see for exam-
ple: Ministerio de Fomento 1888) and different state institutions collect data about different 
categories of delinquency nowadays, one of today’s official crime statistics sources is the Anu-
ario de Estadísticas Policiales (Yearbook of Police Statistics) by the Sección de Estadística (Statistics 
Department), a subdivision of the Departamento de Planificación (Strategic Department) of 
the Poder Judicial (Judiciary). Since 1998, another crime statistics source in Costa Rica has been 
the Estadísticas Judiciales (Judicial Statistics), which includes data from the OIJ and the Ministe-
                                                     
15 This assumption of cause is pure speculation as is every assumption about the “real” crime rates. 
Victim surveys indicate that the number of reported crimes may have declined as many respondents 
declare that they did not press charges. Simultaneously, technical changes in the statistics themselves 
may also have lead to an increase in underreporting in some cases. For example, in 1994 the govern-
ment raised the barrier for what thefts could be included in the statistics. Since then, only thefts of 
items over a certain value are recorded (Calderón/ Rodríguez 2003). 
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rio Público. As the Anuario de Estadísticas Policiales has existed since 1979, I will use it as the 
foundation for the historical perspective of this paper. 
All divisions of the OIJ’s police offices have to hand over their statistics, which are published 
once a year as aggregated and partially analyzed data in the Anuario de Estadísticas Policiales. 
Since 1979, the categories have become increasingly diversified and more and more institu-
tions have been contributing data. 
While practically no one names the source being referred to when talking about crime figures 
in Costa Rican public discourse—for instance, in the media, in politics or in everyday talk—it 
is like to be the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales or the Estadísticas Judiciales, because they are 
the only official sources. Therefore, I will discuss crime rates published in the Anuarios de 
Estadísticas Policiales in the following. At first glance, it might seem contradictory that I first 
generally criticize criminal statistics only to use them as a basis for argumentation afterwards. 
It is not. I will demonstrate below that the crime statistics do not serve as proof of the rising 
crime wave if taken as a significant indicator, if construed generally, and especially not if in-
terpreted against the background of the findings from criminological theory on the statistical 
measurement of delinquency which I presented in Section 2. 
4.1 Intentional Homicide 
Homicide rates are generally the most cited indicator for crime and violence, especially when 
data are compared internationally or historically, because the definitions of and recording of 
this indicator are less inconsistent than in other cases. As the definitions and classifications 
have changed far less in this case then in all others, the numbers are also far more comparable 
over a long time period in terms of statistical logic. Therefore, I can describe this indicator for 
a longer period than I can the others. 
According to the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales, intentional homicide in Costa Rica in-
creased from 4.5 to 8.11 cases per 100,000 inhabitants between 1979 and 2007 (Figure 2). 
Therefore, the directly readable rate increased by nearly 100 percent over 28 years. 
On the basis of these figures it seems justified to state that there has been an increase of inten-
tional homicides in Costa Rica. The absolute number of registered intentional homicides is as 
high than it ever was before. The rate appears to have increased very constantly, something 
which is especially noteworthy given that many people in Costa Rica frequently state that the 
problem arose quiet recently. There has been no obvious break in the constant rise. An abrupt 
rise in the figure could have supported the assumption that there has been an apparent 
change in ”real” homicide development. 
Nevertheless, as there is a significant hidden figure in homicide, the curve progression has to 
be challenged at least slightly on the basis of modern criminology. As I have already noted, 
the hidden figure of homicide logically changes with the progression of forensic and legal 
medical technology. As both have advanced very intensively, it can be assumed that the hid-
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den figure has decreased. In this case, intentional homicide rates were always higher, though 
the percentage of those which were recorded in the statistics used to be lower. It is safe to say 
that the hidden figure was most likely higher in 1979 than in 2007. Other scientifically verifi-
able factors include the increase in the number of law enforcement agency personnel over the 
same period and the decline in technical errors in the collection of data (for instance, through 
the use of networked computers today instead of pencils and typewriters). These factors have 
probably also resulted in higher rates of discovered and recorded intentional homicide. 
Figure 2: Intentional Homicide Rate in Costa Rica (per 100,000 inhabitants), 1978–2007 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 2. 
Finally, my critique is limited to the thesis of the extraordinary rise in intentional homicide. I 
do not disagree with the statement that there has been a rise nor with the observation that in-
dicators demonstrate that there are a noticeable number of homicides in contemporary Costa 
Rica. With an official homicide rate of approximately eight homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, 
Costa Rica has an average ranking in the international comparison provided by the United 
Nations (UNODC 2007). 
4.2 Theft 
Another frequently discussed form of crime is theft, which is often mixed up with homicides in 
the talk of crime. “They kill you for a mobile phone” or “our lives are worth a mobile phone” 
are oft-heard phrases (for example La Nación, November 30, 2007). 
According to the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales, the number of thefts increased from 400 to 
517 cases per 100,000 inhabitants between 1995 and 2007 (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Theft Rate in Costa Rica (per 100,000 inhabitants), 1995–2007 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 3. 
Without any criticism regarding the credibility of the numbers, Figure 3 indicates that the 
number of thefts has increased in the twelve years between 1995 and 2007 and that they might 
have increased by as much as 25 percent. Figure 3 also indicates that theft declined between 
the late 1990s and 2003 and increased again afterwards. The reason for this might not be a 
fundamental change in the “real” number of thefts but once again a change in the methods of 
recording crime data. In 2000 a new unit of the Ministerio Público was created to receive cer-
tain criminal complaints which the OIJ had previously received. In 2005, the OIJ regained the 
responsibility for these complaints (Calderón 2008a: 16 and 113). The decrease and increase in 
the statistics between 2000 and 2005 may be a result of these institutional changes. On the ba-
sis of the figures it seems justified to state that there has been an increase in theft in Costa Rica. 
Nevertheless, the increase seems less extensive than the talk of crime implies. 
Against the background of the distinctive fear of crime in society—hyped not least by citi-
zen’s campaigns and by the sensationalization of crime in the media (Fonseca/Sandoval 2006; 
Vergara 2008; Huhn 2008b)—and the development of law enforcement, it is plausible that the 
hidden figure of theft has decreased in recent years. Firstly, action on the part of police and 
private security actors together with community vigilance may have reduced the hidden fig-
ure. Secondly, the increased social sensibility may have strengthened many people’s self-
perception as victims of a crime which they must report to the police. According to crimino-
logical theory, these processes have with the utmost probability reduced the hidden figure, 
thus making the curve progression potentially less steep in reality. 
The Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales differentiates between theft involving the use of force 
against objects and theft involving violence against people. The first category includes cases 
such as burglary and housebreaking. The second category includes robberies and muggings. 
The numbers for both differ remarkably, something which is important for the evaluation of 
fear of crime. Between 1995 and 2007 the number of thefts involving the use of force against 
objects increased from a rate of 313 registered cases per 100,000 inhabitants to 338 (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Rate of Thefts Involving the Use of Force against Objects in Costa Rica (per 
100,000 inhabitants), 1995–2007 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 4. 
The number of thefts involving violence against people increased from a rate of 88 registered 
cases per 100,000 inhabitants to 179 (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Rate of Thefts Involving Violence against Peoplein Costa Rica (per 100,000 
inhabitants), 1995–2007 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 5. 
Regardless of all the theoretical criticisms on the validity of these rates as indicators of reality, a 
comparison of Figures 4 and 5 indicates at least two things. As their reliability is disputable to 
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the same degree in the light of criminological theory, there exists a (limited) possibility of com-
parability. Firstly, the “real” number of thefts involving the use of force against objects seems to 
be much higher than the number of thefts involving violence against people. This observation 
is important for the talk of crime insofar as it demonstrates that in most cases of theft there is no 
physical violence involved. As already noted, theft is often mixed up with violence in the 
dominant discourse. The statistics and the criticisms of criminology relativize this discourse 
fragment, though they do not challenge it completely. Secondly, the curve progression for 
thefts involving violence against people appears to have increased more steeply than the curve 
progression for thefts without violence. Given the fact that crime with violence involved may 
scare people in a special way, people’s fear cannot be dismissed out of hand completely. 
Again, I have to state that my observations are limited to the curve progression, not to the ac-
tual number of thefts. On the basis of statistics, there are a remarkable number of thefts in con-
temporary Costa Rica. Nevertheless, statements such as those made in the article in this paper’s 
introduction turn out to be cultivating fear on the supposed basis of official statistics. The statis-
tics do not indicate that everybody should be scared all the time, as the dominant discourse 
implies, nor do they unreservedly confirm the everything-used-to-be-better argument. 
4.3 Violations of Narcotics Law 
Violations of narcotics law, such as drug trafficking, drug abuse, and drug dealing, are an-
other frequent topic in the talk of crime. The public perception is that these delicts have in-
creased enormously in recent years (see for example La Nación, June 14, 2007). According to 
the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales, drug-related crimes increased between 1989 and 2000 
but decreased afterwards (Figure 6). 
Leaving aside all theoretical criticisms regarding the “truth value” of these numbers, Figure 6 
indicates at first glance that there was a peak in the recorded violations of narcotics law in 
2000 and another in 2003. After 2003 the number decreased noticeably, and in 2007 it reached 
its lowest level since 1992. The official crime statistics in Costa Rica in no way validate the in-
crease of 700 percent for this delict group since 1990 which Chinchilla proclaims in the news-
paper article cited in the introduction. Figure 6 and Chinchilla’s statement are a perfect ex-
ample of the misuse of crime statistics in the current talk of crime. Firstly, it is easy to inten-
tionally misinterpret the statistics. Secondly, the public proclamation of rather doubtful num-
bers in the knowledge that people will just believe them (as it is highly accepted that num-
bers do not lie) and can hardly prove them wrong is typical of the dominant discourse. 
On the basis of criminological theory it has to be stated that the figures once again do not 
mirror social reality in Costa Rica. As state efforts to investigate and fight drug crimes are 
constantly expanding—together with the crime sensibility in society and therefore probably 
also the number of charges pressed—the rate of violations of narcotics law should also be in-
creasing continuously. In order to explain the decline in the rate during times of extended 
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alertness, a look at narcotics law could provide initial clues, as could the possibility of a para-
digm shift in drug-fighting policies or possible changes in data collection. In spite of all criti-
cism and on the basis of Caldeira’s premise that statistics can at least be used to detect ten-
dencies, it can be assumed that no obvious, alarming trend of an increase in violations of nar-
cotics law can be derived from crime statistics. 
Figure 6: Violations of Narcotics Law in Costa Rica (per 100,000 inhabitants), 1989–2007 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 6. 
4.4 All Recorded Complaints 
Finally, I will display changes in the curve progression for all complaints recorded by the OIJ. 
Figure 7 shows the absolute numbers of complaints [cases of what?] recorded by the OIJ be-
tween 1980 and 2007. 
Read uncritically, the curve progression at first glance demonstrates an obvious increase in 
the rate between 1980 and the mid-1990s. Since then the rate seems to have settled down at a 
level of approximately 1,200 reported cases per 100,000 inhabitants each year. While the per-
sonnel of the OIJ has grown constantly (Figure 1), the number of cases reported to each offi-
cer has declined. 
Once again, the validity of these figures for describing Costa Rican reality is limited in multiple 
ways. Nevertheless, given the fact that more police personnel in more police stations should be 
able to record more cases and that the increasing fear of crime and the current social sensibility 
should lead to more complaints, Figure 8 can hardly be cited as evidence of the alarming trend 
of an increase of crime. 
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Figure 7: Complaints Recorded by the OIJ (per 100,000 inhabitants), 1980–2007 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 7. 
Figure 8: Imprisonment Rate in Costa Rica (per 100,000 inhabitants), 1979–2007 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 9. 
4.5 Crime Scenes 
In the generalizing talk of crime, the entire country is perceived as a permanent crime scene. 
If the statistics can point to tendencies, as Caldeira states, a look at the concrete locations of 
delinquency can help to determine if crime is a nationwide phenomenon. The informative 
value of crime statistics with respect to the geography of delinquency remains highly vague 
in any case. Nevertheless, a critical look at the geographical distribution can help to specify 
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the information on the phenomenon as a precondition for a more objective public discussion 
of violence and crime in Costa Rica. As geographical differentiations are very extensive, I will 
look at this issue only briefly, using the example of intentional homicide, to demonstrate the 
general value of a closer inspection (see also Rico 2006: 20-21). Table 1 shows the distribution 
of all recorded intentional homicides in the seven Costa Rican provinces in 2007. 
Table 1: Regional Distribution of Intentional Homicides in Costa Rica, 2007 
Province Absolute number of 
intentional homicides
Population 
(million) 
Rate of  
intentional homicides  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
San José 176 1.5* 11,7 
Alajuela 37 0.8* 4,6 
Cartago 7 0.5* 1,4 
Heredia 18 0.4* 4,5 
Guanacaste 17 0.3* 4,7 
Puntarenas 40 0.4* 10 
Limón 74 0.4* 18,5 
*  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2008): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San José: Poder Judicial. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Appendix 8. 
Leaving aside the possibility of different capacities for detecting, investigating and solving 
cases of intentional homicide in the single provinces, and the resulting differences in hidden 
figures, Table 1 indicates that there is a likelihood of an uneven geographical distribution of 
intentional homicides. It appears that the majority of homicides in the period depicted took 
place in the province of San José, while the rate (homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) was high-
est in the province of Limón. An objective public discussion of crime in Costa Rica should take 
these geographical differences into account. While the talk of crime in Costa Rica remains very 
vague in terms of the localization of risks, statistics suggest that there are some concrete loca-
tions with higher crime rates. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of all recorded intentional homicides in four districts of the 
province of San José between 1990 and 2004. 
The table shows that the majority of intentional homicides in the province of San José always 
took place in the city of San José. In 2004 the number of homicides in the city was followed by 
the districts of Desamparados, Goicoechea, and Tibás respectively. 
Without further discussing geographical differences in crime, Tables 1 and 2, even as a vague 
indicator of tendencies of social reality, demonstrate the need to discuss crime and violence 
more sophisticatedly in terms of localization and the possible underlying reasons for crime hot 
spots. A geographical differentiation of other indicators may show different spatial concentra-
tions. Nevertheless, in public discussion it seems necessary to look at where crimes happen 
and what reasons can be detected for the particular geographical concentrations. It is an over-
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generalization to claim that the rates of crime and violence are the same for the entire country. 
A closer look could possibly identify socioeconomic reasons for different crime rates in differ-
ent locations, or for other regional problems, such as a complex connection between cities and 
delinquency.16 If an intention of the talk of crime was also to calm fears, inhabitants of many 
concrete locations could breathe a sigh of relief if the locations of delinquency were more spe-
cifically identified. Furthermore, measures for preventing delinquency could be far more ef-
fective. Instead, however, the talk of crime—represented in the media, in politicians’ speeches, 
in laws, and in everyday life—implies that there is a national problem which is getting worse 
and worse and that therefore an enhancement of law and order is necessary everywhere. 
Table 2: The Four Districts with the Highest Number of Intentional Homicides in San 
José (Province), 1990–2004 
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
San José—Province 62 56 68 61 59 72 71 70 76 101 108 83 90 131 111 
San José—City 29 27 36 33 28 38 29 35 36 47 53 40 35 56 37 
Desamparados 6 4 10 6 4 13 16 9 10 18 11 8 11 13 17 
Goicoechea 3 3 4 6 6 2 2 3 5 7 4 4 9 20 10 
Tibás 6 6 1 2 5 3 2 3 1 1 5 8 5 7 12 
Source: Author’s compilation based on PNUD 2006: 574-576. 
4.6 The Myth of Impunity 
As I am already talking about statistics, I will also present a statistic which probably has no 
hidden figure. A constantly repeated argument in the talk of crime is the accusation that the 
state is not tough enough on criminals. “They can rob or even kill someone and get arrested, 
and they are back on the streets the next day anyway,” is an oft-expressed opinion (see for 
example La Nación, September 6, 2007). While this accusation has existed at least since the 
1950s (Huhn 2009) and while the penalties for many criminal acts have been stiffened in the 
last decades—for instance, the raising of the maximum prison penalty from 25 to 50 years in 
1994 (Asamblea Legislativa 1994b) or the maximum prison sentence for adolescents, which is 
one of the highest worldwide (Peetz 2008: 27)—the call for the “iron fist” (mano dura) remains 
popular. I have proven this elsewhere on the basis of interviews I took in Costa Rica in 2006 
(Huhn 2008a). Many newspaper articles provide evidence of the enduring call for the mano 
dura (for example: La Nación, November 30, 2007 or La Nación, November 28, 2008). 
Figure 8 shows the development of the imprisonment rate in Costa Rica. 
While criminal statistics are particularly questionable, there can be little doubt about the cor-
rect counting of the inmates in state prisons. Figure 8 clearly shows that the number of pris-
oners in Costa Rica has consistently increased. With a rate of 209–210 convicts per 100,000 in-
                                                     
16  On the relation of property crime and social change in Costa Rica see Calderón 2003 and Calderón 2008b. 
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habitants between 2004 and 2007, the number was higher than ever. Figure 8 may not serve 
as an irrevocable disproval of the common thesis of weak legal actions, but it at least suggests 
that this assumption is questionable. 
4.7 On the Relation of Recorded and Represented Crimes 
Finally, I will present a comparison, undertaken by the UNDP, of the vague crime statistics 
and the representation of delinquency in the media. The comparison clarifies a fourth fun-
damental disproportionality—in addition to the general misrepresentation of crime statistics, 
the blurring of the spatial distribution of delinquency, and the stereotype that there are not 
enough crime-fighting measures even though the state is continually reinforcing law and or-
der—in the talk of crime. Table 3 shows the percentage of deaths from traffic accidents, thefts, 
drug-related crimes, and intentional homicides as well as the frequency with which they 
were reported on in all articles about delinquency between January 19 and February 1, 2004 
in Costa Rican newspapers, as evaluated by the UNDP. 
Table 3: Percentage of Recorded Criminal Acts and Prevalence of Their Representation 
in Print Media, 2004 
Delict Total number of  
recorded cases 
Percentage of  
recorded cases 
Percentage of articles 
about delinquency 
Criminal acts reported to the OIJ 52,215 100 100 
Intentional homicide 265 0.5 27 
Death in traffic accident 592 1 19 
Theft 19,697 38 10 
Violations of narcotics law 1,112 2 3 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de 
Estadística (2005): Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2004, San José: Poder 
Judicial and PNUD 2006: 271. 
While I do not consider any of the numbers and rates of crimes even roughly trustworthy, 
they might at least provide a small hint regarding the tendencies in social reality. Keeping 
this in consideration, Table 3 demonstrates a noticeable disparity between delinquency and 
its representation in the talk of crime. 
The media’s sensationalism (Fonseca/Sandoval 2006; Vergara 2008; Huhn 2008b) puts a per-
manent spotlight on the most violent, unsettling, and disturbing crimes in the country and 
gives the impression that these cases are the rule and their frequency is “reality.” Intentional 
homicides are significantly overrepresented in the national media. While they account for 0.5 
percent of all crimes reported to the police, 27 percent of newspaper articles in the period of 
the UNDP’s sample dealt with it. Concerning the consequences of this misrepresentation, the 
UNDP rightly concludes the following: 
26 Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 
In Costa Rica the people inform themselves primarily with news from television and 
newspapers; they accept the “media reality” as the “reality of their personal environ-
ment,” which means they do not consider the fact that the media presents a version of 
reality instead of reality itself. 
(PNUD 2006: 271) 
Murder obviously sells papers, but the permanent and generalizing media coverage also 
scares people and affects the dominant discourse. As a consequence, it also affects the social 
order in Costa Rica. The common knowledge that the “life of every Costa Rican is worth a 
mobile phone” is not least the result of irresponsible and improportionate media coverage of 
crime. Additionally, in Costa Rica articles on crime have moved from the juridical or police 
pages to the political and, in particular, front pages of newspapers, a trend which Ricón and 
Rey have detected across the whole Latin American continent (2009: 122). 
5 Conclusions 
The analysis of Costa Rican crime statistics can be summarized as follows: 
1) In general, crime rates have not exploded in the last 20 years. In the case of some delicts, 
figures have increased continuously; in other cases they have reached a peak and then 
decreased afterwards. Nevertheless, the figures for some kinds of crimes have generally 
increased and are not insignificant. 
2) Crime statistics also display a noticeable spatial concentration of delinquency. I have ex-
emplified this for the case of intentional homicide, where the cities and especially San José 
are the hot spots, followed in turn by particular districts. While the dominant discourse 
presents the whole country as a permanent crime scene, a closer look at the “real” loca-
tions of high crime rates can possibly identify the reasons behind the crimes as well as po-
tential groups of victims and thereby reduce the fear of crime. 
3) Crime statistics can also document state crime-fighting measures. I exemplified this using 
the case of the OIJ personnel and the development of the number of prisoners in Costa 
Rica. It is not my intention to justify the escalation of the fight against crime and the en-
forcement of law and order, either from a scientific or a political point of view. Neverthe-
less, the figures show that the continually repeated accusation that the Costa Rican gov-
ernment is not doing enough to fight crime cannot be supported without reservation. 
4) Finally, the crime rates are disproportionate to the representation of crime in dominant 
discourse. The media particularly spotlights violent crimes, the number of which, among 
all investigated crimes, is rather small. As media coverage is normally perceived as a mir-
ror of reality, the overrepresentation of violent crimes fuels the fear of crime in the sense 
of the expression that “the life of a Costa Rican is today worth a mobile phone.” 
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In a paper about crime statistics, the historian Herbert Reinke tells the story of a conflict re-
garding national crime statistics in Great Britain in the 1890s. A group of experts was in-
structed to finally clarify the question of whether there was a “crime wave” in the country ac-
cording to the statistics. Afterwards, a state secretary from the Ministry of the Interior sum-
marized the various conclusions which the experts had drawn from one and the same source. 
One expert said “that crime is on the increase.” The second said “that crime is on the de-
crease.” The third authority stated “that crime is nearly stationary, about keeping pace with 
the growth in population” (Reinke 1991: 19). 
This anecdote can easily be applied to Costa Rican crime statistics. Some of the figures pre-
sented in this paper can indeed be read as evidence of increasing delinquency, as in the case of 
intentional homicide or theft involving violence against people. Others seem at first glance to 
prove the opposite: the rate of theft involving the use of force against objects, the rate of viola-
tions of narcotics law, or the general rate of criminal acts reported to the OIJ. In all cases, the 
remarkable efforts of the Costa Rican police in detecting, investigating, and solving crimes 
could be said to relativize the validity of the crime statistics. The figures presented on the OIJ’s 
personnel and the number of prisoners could be said to underline the state’s success in fight-
ing crime. One could say that the number of intentional homicides has not grown that dra-
matically while the number of solved murder cases has. 
Even if one tries to read Costa Rican criminal statistics as uncritically as possible, they still do 
not unrestrainedly sustain the continually proclaimed notion of an “explosion” of violence and 
crime made in the dominant discourse. A critical evaluation of the bare figures suggests that 
the continual citing of the statistically proven increase in violence and crime in Costa Rica has 
to be questioned and relativized in many ways. The numbers can be read as a slight increase or 
even as a possible stagnation in some cases, and against the background of criminology both of 
these are more plausible than the “explosion,” which is hard to verify for most of the indicators, 
even if one tries very hard to prove a “crime wave” on the basis of the statistics. 
Nevertheless, the point of view cited in the introduction is the dominant perception. Of the 
various huge increases in crime rates Chinchilla talks about, only the increase of intentional 
homicides can be affirmed with the statistics, though one still has to ask if the increase has 
really been that enormous. In all other cases, the statistics actually display a far lower increase 
than that proclaimed in the talk of crime, and in some cases even a decrease. Chinchilla could 
have cited the statistics to prove the achievements of the government, of which she was at the 
time the vice president, but she did not. Furthermore, she could have underlined the definite 
spatiality of delinquency in Costa Rica as well as undermined the accusation regarding the 
state’s inactivity on the basis of the reinforcement of the security sector or the increasing num-
ber of convicted offenders. She could have debilitated the talk of crime instead of fueling it. A 
responsible demand by society for more objectivity in the talk of crime could help to weaken 
the trends of increasing demand for the iron fist; of spatial segregation; of the weakening of 
the state monopoly on violence through increasingly more private security measures; and, not 
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least, of the widespread fear of crime. The expounding of a “crime rate explosion,” on the con-
trary, stimulates the process which Scheerer in 1978 coined the political-publicist circle of in-
tensification (Scheerer 1978). The more the media publishes stories about public insecurity, the 
more politicians react with law enforcement; reciprocally, the more politicians push the 
agenda of fighting violence and crime, the more the media covers these topics. According to 
Scheerer, media and politics thereby stimulate each other. 
In accordance with the criminological theory presented in this paper, this circle of intensifica-
tion can also be heightened by the crime rates themselves: the talk of crime leads to higher 
crime rates. The more the media reports on crime and politicians thus take action, the more 
delicts are detected. This, in turn, might lead the media to talk about a crime wave, which 
may cause society to demand law and order, which might dispose politicians to increasing 
actions and penalties once again. This never-ending cycle continues without even one closer 
look at the “real” rates of, locations of, facets of, or reasons for crime. 
The Costa Rican talk of crime needs to be rationalized to a much greater degree. In summary, 
this paper is a request for dispassion in the Costa Rican talk of crime. This request is based on 
a rereading of crime statistics against the background of criminological science. As crime sta-
tistics do not satisfactorily answer the question of why the fear of crime is particularly peaking 
today, it is worthwhile to take a look at possible changes in the context of the talk of crime. 
Firstly, there is a remarkable level of distrust in the political elite, which makes it harder for 
politicians or parties to enforce unpopular political programs which do not follow the talk of 
crime themselves. Theoretically, it may be that it is getting harder to dispute “governing 
through crime” (Simon 2007) once it has been implemented. If such policies are implemented, 
fear of crime needs to be kept up in order to support the policies’ existence. If crime fighting is 
the focal point of a government’s program or a party’s campaign promise, crime itself needs to 
maintain the people’s main problem. Secondly, social uncertainty may have increased in con-
temporary Costa Rica in the context of cutbacks to the welfare state and the implementation of 
a neoliberal development model. While it is often stated that these social changes have modi-
fied crime trends themselves (in terms of increased need and desperation), I argue that they 
have also changed the way crime is perceived. 
In the forthcoming and second part of the paper, I will therefore address two more fragments 
of the talk of crime: its historicity and its politicization. In the current discourse, the opinion 
that violence and crime have recently become a huge problem and that “everything used to 
be better” is hegemonic, while the moment the declared problem began is never named. The 
common belief is that just a few years ago the issue virtually did not exist, and that the fur-
ther one looks back in history, the better things were. I have argued elsewhere that this per-
ception relates to the specific and imagined national self-perception of Costa Rica as a non-
violent nation, an ideal which is mediated by collective memory and amnesia (Huhn 2008b; 
Huhn 2009). In the second part of this paper I will show that the perception that violence and 
crime are becoming a bigger problem each day has already prevailed for at least the last 60 
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years (and therefore for the entire history of the Second Republic). I will furthermore discuss 
the relevance of the social and political context to the talk of crime. If the crime statistics by 
no means automatically indicate that the amount of fear and panic in Costa Rican society is 
justified, the idea that Costa Rican politicians could solve the problem simply by rationalizing 
it suggests itself. I will argue that certain specifically Costa Rican as well as general social fac-
tors exclude this possibility. 
30 Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 
Primary Sources 
Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica (19981): Decreto Ejecutivo 1268-SP. 
Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica (1974): Ley No. 5524: Ley Orgánica del 
Organismo de Investigación Judicial (May 7, 1974). 
Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica (1994a): Ley No. 7410: Ley General de 
Policía (May 30, 1994). 
Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica (1994b): Ley No. 7389 (April 22, 1994). 
Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica (2000): Ley No. 8000: Creación del 
Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas (May 5, 2000). 
Escuela Nacional de Policía José Francisco Orlich B.: Historia (www.msp.go.cr/escuela_ 
policia/historia.html). 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población 
por sexo y edad (cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC. 
La Nación 
Ministerio de Fomento, Sección de Estadística (1888): Anuario Estadístico 1887, San Jose: Im-
prenta Nacional. 
Ministerio de Justicia (2007): Un Pais sin Miedo. Plan Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia 
y Promición de la Paz Social 2007-2010, San José. 
Ministerio de Justicia. Dirección General de Adoptación Social. Instituto Nacional de Cri-
minología. Departamento de Investigación Estadística (2008): Anuario Estadístico 2008, 
San José. 
Ministerio de Planificación—MIDEPLAN: Ambiente, seguridad ciudadana y modernización 
institucional (http://mideplan5.mideplan.go.cr/PND_ADM_PACHECO/Html/panorama- 
ambiente-seguridad.htm#Seguridad). 
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica—MIDEPLAN (2004): Informe 
final sobre el cumplimiento de las metas, los objetivos, las prioridades y las acciones 
estratégicas del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo “Monseñor Victor Manuel Sanabria Martí 
nez” 2002-2006 y su aporte al desarrollo económico, social y ambiental del país Año 
2003, San José. 
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica—MIDEPLAN (2007): Informe 
final sobre el cumplimiento de las metas, los objetivos, las prioridades y las acciones 
estratégicas del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo “Monseñor Victor Manuel Sanabria Martí-
nez” 2002-2006 y su aporte al desarrollo económico, social y ambiental del país. Informe 
Final, San José. 
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica—MIDEPLAN (2007): Plan Nacio-
nal de Desarrollo 2006-2010, San José. 
Ministerio de Salud (2004): La Violencia Social en Costa Rica, San José: Organización Pan-
americana de Salud. 
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica: Historia (www.msp.go.cr/sobre_ministerio/ 
historia.html) 
Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 31 
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica: Historia de los Servicios de Guardacostas, 
(www.msp.go.cr/guardacostas/historia.html) 
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública de Costa Rica: Seguridad Privada (www.msp.go.cr/seguridad_ 
privada/estadisticas.html) 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2008): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2007): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2006, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2005): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2004, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2004): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2003, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2002): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2001, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2000): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1999, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1994): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1993, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1990): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1989, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1988): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1987, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1984): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1983, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1982): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1981, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1980): 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1979, San José: Poder 
Judicial. 
32 Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 
Bibliography 
Brinkmann, Bernd et al. (1997): Fehlleistungen bei der Leichenschau in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Ergebnisse einer multizentrischen Studie, in: Archiv für Kriminologie,  
No. 1991: 1-12/65-74. 
Caldeira, Teresa P. R. (2000): City of Walls. Crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo, 
Berceley / London: University of California Press. 
Calderón Umaña, Rodolfo (2006): El Delito en Costa Rica: una propuesta analítica, in: Re-
vista Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 83-121. 
Calderón Umaña, Rodolfo (2008a): Transgresores y Globalización en Costa Rica: Un análisis 
de las causas sociales del Delito, San José: FLACSO. 
Calderón Umaña, Rodolfo (2008b): Delito y cambio social en Costa Rica: resultados de 
investigación, Observatory on Inequality in Latin America Working Paper Series No. 12, 
Center for Latin American Studies, University of Miami. 
Calderón Umaña, Rodolfo/ Rodríguez, Diego (2003): Informe sobre el Comportamento de los 
casos registrados en el Organismo de Investigación Judicial entre 1991 y 2000, San José: 
Poder Judicial. 
Carrión, Fernando / Espín, Johanna (2009) (eds.): Un lenguaje colectivo en construcción: el 
diagnóstico de la violencia, Quito: FLACSO. 
Cohen, Stanley (1972): Folk devils and moral panics, London: Mac Gibbon and Kee. 
Coleman, Clive / Moynihan, Jenny (1996): Understanding Crime Data, Buckingham / Phila-
delphia: Open University Press. 
Cremer-Schäfer, Helga (1998): Kriminalitätsdiskurse und die Politik mit der Strafe, in: Cremer-
Schäfer, Helga / Steinert, Heinz: Straflust und Repression. Zur Kritik der populistischen 
Kriminologie, Münster, pp. 147-164. 
Fonseca Vindas, Karina / Sandoval García, Carlos (2006): Medios de communicación e (in)se-
guridad ciudadana en Costa Rica, San José: Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el 
Desarrollo Humano. 
Hoyle, Carolyn / Zedner, Lucia (2007): Victims, victimization, and criminal justice, in: Ma-
guire, Mike / Morgan, Rod / Reiner, Robert (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 341-495. 
Huhn, Sebastian (2005): Einwanderungsdiskurse und Migrationspolitik in Costa Rica. Wan-
del und Konstanten in der gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung mit der nikaraguani-
schen Migration seit den 1980er Jahren (Beiträge zur Lateinamerika-Forschung, Bd. 18), 
Hamburg: IIK. 
Huhn, Sebastian (2008a): Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua: 
Social Perceptions in Everyday Life, GIGA Working Paper, No. 81, Hamburg: GIGA. 
Huhn, Sebastian (2008b): A History of Nonviolence: Insecurity and the Normative Power of 
the Imagined in Costa Rica, GIGA Working Paper, No. 84, Hamburg: GIGA. 
Huhn, Sebastian (2009): Contested Cornerstones of Nonviolent National Self-Perception in 
Costa Rica. A Historical Approach, GIGA Working Paper, No. 101, Hamburg: GIGA. 
Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 33 
Jäger, Siegfried (42004): Kritische Diskursanalyse. Eine Einführung, Münster. 
Löfberg, Sara (2009): Ojos de Águila: una primera aproximación al sistema de video vigilan-
cia en Quito, in: Carrión, Fernando / Espín, Johanna (2009) (eds.): Un lenguaje colectivo 
en construcción: el diagnóstico de la violencia, Quito: FLACSO, pp. 137-157. 
Loría Ramírez, Max Alberto (2006): Comision Nacional de Prevención de la violencia y la 
promoción de la Paz Social. Diagnostico de Recursos, capacidades y experiencias, San 
José: Fundación Friedrich Ebert. 
Maguire, Mike (2002): Crime statistics. The „data explosion” and its implications, in: Ma-
guire, Mike / Morgan, Rod / Reiner, Robert (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 322-375. 
Maguire, Mike (2007): Crime Data and Statistics, in: Maguire, Mike / Morgan, Rod / Reiner, 
Robert (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 241-301. 
Matul, Daniel / Dinarte, Geannina (2005): Enfoques Políticos vigentes sobre Seguridad Ciuda-
dana en Costa Rica, San José: Fundación Friedrich Ebert. 
Morgan, Jane (1988): Children as victims, in: Maguire, Mike / Pointing, John (eds.): Victims of 
Crime. A new Deal?, Milton Keynes / Philadelphia: Open University Press, pp. 74-82. 
Muncie, John (1996): The Construction and Deconstruction of Crime, in: Muncie, John / Mc 
Laughlin, Eugene (eds.): The Problem of Crime, London / Thousand Oaks / New Delhi: 
Sage, pp. 5-63. 
Muncie, John (22004): Youth & Crime, London / Thousand Oaks / New Delhi: Sage. 
Nissen, Sylke (2003): Vom Nutzen des Kriminalitätsschadens oder: Verbrechen zahlt sich aus, 
in: Nissen, Sylke (ed.): Kriminalität und Sicherheitspolitik. Analysen aus London, Paris, 
Berlin und New York, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, pp. 103-136. 
Peetz, Peter (2008): Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua: Youth, 
Crime, and the Responses of the State, GIGA Working Paper, No. 80, Hamburg: GIGA. 
PNUD (Programa de Naciones Unidas Para el Desarrollo) (2006): Informe Nacional de Des-
arrollo Humano 2005. Venciendo el temor. (In)seguridad ciudadana y desarrollo huma-
no en Costa Rica, San José: PNUD. 
Reinke, Herbert (1991): “Verbrecher-Statistiken, welche in den neuesten Zeiten sehr beliebt 
geworden sind“. Reflexionen über die Verwendung von Kriminalstatistiken in der his-
torischen Forschung, in: Robert, Philippe / Emsley, Clive (eds.): Geschichte und Soziolo-
gie des Verbrechens, Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 19-29. 
Rey, Germán (2005): El Cuerpo de Delito, Colombia: Entro de Competencia en Comunica-
ción para America Latina. 
Rico, José María (2003): Costa Rica, in: US Department of Justice—Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics: The World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems (www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
wfcjscr_sp.pdf). 
Rico, José María (2006): (In)seguridad ciudadana en Costa Rica: balance de la situación, San 
José: Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. 
34 Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 
Ricón, Omar / Rey, Germán (2009): Los cuentos mediáticos del miedo, in: Carrión, Fernando / 
Espín, Johanna (2009) (eds.): Un lenguaje colectivo en construcción: el diagnóstico de la 
violencia, Quito: FLACSO, pp. 117-135. 
Scheerer, Sebastian (1978): Der politisch-publizistische Verstärkerkreislauf. Zur Beeinflussung 
der Massenmedien im Prozeß strafrechtlicher Normgenese, in: Kriminologisches Journal, 
10, pp. 223-227. 
Schmidt, Daniel (2005): Statistik und Staatlichkeit, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissen-
schaften. 
Simon, Jonathan (2007): Governing Through Crime. How the War on Crime Transformed Am-
erican Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Stanko, Elizabeth A. (1988): Hidden violence against women, in: Maguire, Mike / Pointing, 
John (eds.): Victims of Crime. A new Deal?, Milton Keynes / Philadelphia: Open Univer-
sity Press, pp. 40-46. 
Sykes, Gresham M. / Matza, David (1996): Techniques of neutralization, in: Muncie, John / Mc 
Laughlin, Eugene / Langan, Mary (eds.): Criminological Perspectives. A Reader, London / 
Thousand Oaks / New Delhi: Sage, pp. 206-223. 
UNODC—United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007): The Ninth United Nations 
Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of the Criminal Justice Systems, New York: 
United Nations. 
Vergara Heidke, Adrián (2008): Análisis crítico del sensacionalismo: la construcción mediática 
de la criminalidad en la televisión costarricense, in: Iberoamericana. América Latina—
España—Portugal, Vol. VIII, No. 32, pp. 99-117. 
Young, Jock (1988): Risk of crime and fear of crime: a realist critique of survey-based assump-
tions, in: Maguire, Mike / Pointing, John (eds.): Victims of Crime. A new Deal?, Milton 
Keynes / Philadelphia: Open University Press, pp. 164-186. 
Young, Jock (2004): Voodoo Criminology and the Numbers Game, in: Ferrell, Jeff / Hayward, 
Keith / Morrison, Wayne / Presdee, Mike (eds.): Cultural Criminology Unleashed, Portland: 
Cavendish, pp. 13-28. 
Zedner, Lucia (1997): Victims, in: Maguire, Mike / Morgan, Rod / Reiner, Robert (eds.): The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 35 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ) Personnel, 1988–2003 
Year Personnel
1988 819 
1989 891 
1990 916 
1991 969 
1992 986 
1993 1,021 
1994 1,186 
1995 1,246 
1996 1,258 
1997 1,327 
1998 1,352 
1999 1,428 
2000 1,442 
2001 1,475 
2002 1,520 
2003 1,562 
Source: Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección Planes y Presupuesto: Informe del 
Crecimiento del Recurso Humano en el Poder Judicial 1988-2003, www.poder-judicial.go.cr/planifica 
cion/INFORMES/PP/PER88-03.XLS 
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Appendix 2: Cases of Intentional Homicide in Costa Rica, 1979–2007 
Year Absolute number Population 
(million) 
Rate  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
1979 98(1) 2.2* 4.45 
1980 100(2) 2.3* 4.35 
1981 101(2) 2.4* 4.21 
1982 87(3) 2.5* 3.50 
1983 94(3) 2.5* 3.76 
1984 98(4) 2.6* 3.77 
1985 109(5) 2.7* 4.03 
1986 103(5) 2.8* 3.68 
1987 113(5) 2.8* 4.04 
1988 117(5) 2.9* 4.03 
1989 116(5) 3.0* 3.87 
1990 139(6) 3.1* 4.48 
1991 132(6) 3.1* 4.26 
1992 160(6) 3.2* 5.00 
1993 160(6) 3.3* 4.85 
1994 182(6) 3.4* 5.35 
1995 184(6) 3.5* 5.26 
1996 189(6) 3.6* 5.25 
1997 210(6) 3.7* 5.68 
1998 224(6) 3.8* 5.89 
1999 245(6) 3.8* 6.45 
2000 240(7) 3.9* 6.15 
2001 251(7) 4.0** 6.28 
2002 251(7) 4.1** 6.12 
2003 292(7) 4.1** 7.12 
2004 265(7) 4.2** 6.31 
2005 300(7) 4.3** 6.98 
2006 338(7) 4.3** 7.86 
2007 357(7) 4.4** 8.11 
Notes: 
* Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, pp. 23-24. 
** Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, p. 63. 
Sources: 
(1) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1980): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1979, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VII. 
(2) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1982): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1981, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VII und VIII. 
(3) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1984): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1983, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VII. 
(4) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1988): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1987, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VIII. 
(5) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1990): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1989, San José: Poder Judicial, p. XIV 
(6) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2000): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1999, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(7) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2008): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San José: Poder Judicial. 
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Appendix 3: Theft in Costa Rica, 1995–2007 
Year Absolute number Population 
(million) 
Rate  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
1995 14,034 3.5 400.97 
1996 14,519 3.6 403.31 
1997 16,264 3.7 439.57 
1998 16,349 3.8 430.24 
1999 18,988 3.8 486.87 
2000 18,228 3.9 467.38 
2001 16,410 4.0 410.25 
2002 14,908 4.1 363.61 
2003 17,457 4.1 281.71 
2004 19,697 4.2 468.98 
2005 21,285 4.3 495.00 
2006 23,178 4.3 539.02 
2007 22,758 4.4 517.23 
Sources: Appendix 4 and Appendix 5. 
Appendix 4: Theft Involving the Use of Force against Objects in Costa Rica, 1995–2007 
Year Absolute number Population 
(million) 
Rate  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
1995 10,954(1) 3.5* 312.97 
1996 10,912(1) 3.6* 303.11 
1997 11,781(1) 3.7* 318.40 
1998 12,333(1) 3.8* 324.55 
1999 14,101(1) 3.8* 371.08 
2000 13,261(2) 3.9* 340.02 
2001 11,501(2) 4.0** 287.53 
2002 10,923(2) 4.1** 266.41 
2003 11,550(3) 4.1** 281.71 
2004 13,064(3) 4.2** 311.05 
2005 14,538(3) 4.3** 338.09 
2006 15,474(3) 4.3** 359.86 
2007 14,873(3) 4.4** 338.02 
Notes: 
*  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, pp. 23-24. 
**  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, p. 63. 
Sources: 
(1)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2000): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1999, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(2)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2004): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2003, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(3)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2008): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San José: Poder Judicial. 
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Appendix 5: Theft Involving Violence against People in Costa Rica, 1995–2007 
Year Absolute number Population 
(million) 
Rate  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
1995 3,080(1) 3.5* 88.00 
1996 3,607(1) 3.6* 100.19 
1997 4,483(1) 3.7* 121.16 
1998 4,016(1) 3.8* 105.68 
1999 4,887(2) 3.8* 128.61 
2000 4,963(2) 3.9* 127.26 
2001 4,909(2) 4.0** 122.73 
2002 3,985(2) 4.1** 97.20 
2003 5,907(2) 4.1** 144.07 
2004 6,633(3) 4.2** 157.93 
2005 6,747(3) 4.3** 156.91 
2006 7,704(3) 4.3** 179.16 
2007 7,885(3) 4.4** 179.20 
Notes: 
*  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, pp. 23-24. 
**  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, p. 63. 
Sources: 
(1)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2000): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1999, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(2)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2004): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2003, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(3)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2007): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2008, San José: Poder Judicial. 
Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement 39 
Appendix 6: Violations of Narcotics Law (Investigated Cases) in Costa Rica, 1989–2007 
Year Absolute number Population 
(million) 
Rate  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
1989 205(1) 3.0* 6.83 
1990 305(1) 3.1* 9.84 
1991 428(1) 3.1* 13.81 
1992 348(1) 3.2* 10.88 
1993 461(1) 3.3* 13.97 
1994 564(2) 3.4* 16.59 
1995 586(2) 3.5* 16.74 
1996 612(2) 3.6* 17.00 
1997 806(2) 3.7* 21.78 
1998 735(2) 3.8* 19.34 
1999 908(22) 3.8* 23.89 
2000 1,284(3) 3.9* 32.92 
2001 931(3) 4.0** 23.28 
2002 1,099(3) 4.1** 26.80 
2003 1,358(4) 4.1** 33.12 
2004 1,112(4) 4.2** 25.86 
2005 1,006(4) 4.3** 23.40 
2006 764(4) 4.3** 17.77 
2007 568(4) 4.4** 12.91 
Notes: 
*  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, pp. 23-24. 
**  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, p. 63. 
Sources: 
(1)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1994): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1993, San José: Poder Judicial, p. 42. 
(2)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2003): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2002, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(3)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2005): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2004, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(4)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2008): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San José: Poder Judicial. 
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Appendix 7: All Complaints Recorded by the OIJ, 1980–2007* 
Year Absolute number Population 
(million) 
Rate  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
1980 13,729(1) 2.3** 596.91 
1981 23,291(1) 2.4** 970.46 
1982 25,259(1) 2.5** 1,010.36 
1983 21,773(1) 2.5** 870.92 
1984 22,343(1) 2.6** 859.35 
1985 23,249(1) 2.7** 861.07 
1986 23,320(1) 2.8** 832.86 
1987 23,628(1) 2.8** 843.86 
1988 25,207(1) 2.9** 869.21 
1989 28,317(1) 3.0** 943.9 
1990 32,096(1) 3.1** 1,035.35 
1991 40,331(1) 3.1** 1,301 
1992 45,511(1) 3.2** 1,422.21 
1993 46,723(1) 3.3** 1,415.85 
1994 50,218(1) 3.4** 1,477 
1995 45,338(1) 3.5** 1,295.37 
1996 44,375(1) 3.6** 1,232.64 
1997 44,321(1) 3.7** 1,197.86 
1998 45,522(1) 3.8** 1,197.95 
1999 48,126(1) 3.8** 1,266.47 
2000 48,357(1) 3.9** 1,239.92 
2001 45,124(1) 4.0*** 1,128.1 
2002 43,842(2) 4.1*** 1,069.32 
2003 50,100(2) 4.1*** 1,221.95 
2004 52,215(2) 4.2*** 1,243.21 
2005 53,323(2) 4.3*** 1,240.07 
2006 54,178(2) 4.3*** 1,259.95 
2007 53,383(2) 4.4*** 1,213.25 
Notes: 
*  The number of all recorded cases does not represent the number of all detected crimes. Some complaints are 
not violations of the law by definition (for instance, many disappearances of persons or natural deaths), and 
others are identified in the investigations as not being violations of the law. 
**  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, pp. 23-24. 
***  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, p. 63. 
Sources: 
(1)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2002): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2001, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(2)  Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2008): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San José: Poder Judicial. 
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Appendix 8: Cases of Intentional Homicide in Costa Rican Provinces, 1979–2007 
Year Costa Rica San José Alajuela Cartago Heredia Guanacaste Puntarenas Limón 
1979   98(1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1980  100(2)*   27 19   4   5 16 16 14 
1981  101(2)*   37 20   5   5   8 12 16 
1982    87(3)*   27   4   6   3 13   8 23 
1983    94(3)*   39 13   4   8   8 15   8 
1984   98(4)   36 15   5   3   8 18 13 
1985 109(5)   33 17   9   5 13   5 27 
1986 103(5)   41 10   4   6   4 19 19 
1987  113(5)*   47 14   6   4   7 17 19 
1988 117(5)   40 21   7   9   7 13 20 
1989 116(5)   41 19 10   9   6 17 14 
1990 139(6)   62 19   7   6   7 12 26 
1991 132(6)   56 17   9   1   9 18 22 
1992 160(6)   68 13 12   9 16 13 29 
1993 160(6)   61 21   8 11 13 13 33 
1994 182(6)   59 26 15 10   9 22 41 
1995 184(6)   72 23 12 11   7 15 44 
1996 189(6)   71 21   9 12   9 26 41 
1997 210(6)   70 36 20 10   9 28 37 
1998 224(6)   76 28 12 15 10 24 59 
1999 245(6) 101 25 16 12 15 24 52 
2000 240(7) 108 28 16 16 13 15 44 
2001 251(7)   83 45 16 22 11 26 48 
2002 251(7)   90 42 16 30 16 19 38 
2003 292(7) 131 37 19 23 18 30 34 
2004 265(7) 111 31 13 18 11 29 52 
2005 300(7) 156 36 20 16 16 37 57 
2006 338(7) 144 32 18 21 29 40 67 
2007 357(7) 176 37   7 18 17 40 74 
Note: 
* The numbers from the PNUD differ from the numbers of the Anuarios de Estadísticas del Organismo de Inves-
tigación Judicial. The biggest difference is evident for 1982, where PNUD names 3 fewer homicides than the 
Poder Judicial. 
Sources: 
1980-2004 from PNUD 2006: 574-576; 2005-2007 from Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planifica-
ción, Sección de Estadística (2008): Anuario de Estadísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San 
José: Poder Judicial. 
(1) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1980): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1979, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VII. 
(2) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1982): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1981, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VII und VIII. 
(3) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1984): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1983, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VII. 
(4) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1988): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1987, San José: Poder Judicial, p. VIII. 
(5) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (1990): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1989, San José: Poder Judicial, p. XIV 
(6) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2000): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 1999, San José: Poder Judicial. 
(7) Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística (2008): Anuario de Esta-
dísticas del Organismo de Investigación Judicial 2007, San José: Poder Judicial. 
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Appendix 9: Number of Persons Imprisoned in Costa Rica, 1979–2007 
Year Absolute number(1) Population 
(million) 
Rate  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
1979 2,156 2.2* 98.00 
1980 2,361 2.3* 102.65 
1981 2,660 2.4* 110.83 
1982 2,902 2.5* 116.08 
1983 3,228 2.5* 129.12 
1984 3,357 2.6* 129.12 
1985 3,754 2.7* 139.04 
1986 4,069 2.8* 145.32 
1987 4,482 2.8* 160.07 
1988 4,545 2.9* 156.72 
1989 3,892 3.0* 129.73 
1990 3,905 3.1* 125.97 
1991 3,641 3.1* 117.45 
1992 3,443 3.2* 107.59 
1993 2,817 3.3* 85.36 
1994 3,272 3.4* 96.24 
1995 3,490 3.5* 99.71 
1996 4,705 3.6* 130.69 
1997 5,424 3.7* 146.59 
1998 6,004 3.8* 158 
1999 6,943 3.8* 182.71 
2000 7,575 3.9* 194.23 
2001 7,649 4.0** 191.23 
2002 8,113 4.1** 197.88 
2003 8,407 4.1** 205.05 
2004 8,890 4.2** 211.67 
2005 9,053 4.3** 210.53 
2006 9,037 4.3** 210.16 
2007 9,211 4.4** 209.34 
Notes: 
* Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, pp. 23-24. 
** Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2008): Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población por sexo y edad 
(cifras actualizadas), San José: INEC, p. 63. 
Source: 
(1) Ministerio de Justicia. Dirección General de Adoptación Social. Instituto Nacional de Criminología. Departa-
mento de Investigación Estadística (2008): Anuario Estadístico 2008, San José. 
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